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Abstract
Yield curves on advanced economies’ government debt imply that finan-
cial markets expect short-term interest rates to remain close to or at the Zero
Lower Bound (ZLB) for many years or decades to come. In such a situation,
conventional monetary policy can no longer be employed for macroeconomic
stabilization. Therefore, I investigate an alternative ‘old Keynesian’ fiscal
policy in which government spending endogenously responds to inflation and
the output gap, while the nominal interest rate is pegged at the ZLB. I do so
within a standard Representative Agent New Keynesian model (RANK), as
well as a two-period Overlapping Generations New Keynesian model (OLG-
NK). For both model versions, I find that the equilibrium values for inflation
and the output gap under a standard Taylor rule regime can be replicated
under the ‘old Keynesian’ regime. However, a unique stable countercycli-
cal equilibrium is only feasible within the OLG-NK model. Finally I show
that the old Keynesian policy features a ‘fiscal’ divine coincidence under
which government spending can simultaneously ensure zero inflation and
elimination of the output gap.
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1 Introduction
The regular New Keynesian model is closed by formulating a Taylor rule in which
the nominal interest rate endogenously responds to inflation and the output gap
(Woodford (2003) and subsequent literature). However, such a rule does not pro-
vide a realistic description once the economy lands at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB),
in which case unconventional monetary policies and fiscal policy are typically em-
ployed for macroeconomic stabilization. Such a situation particularly applies to
advanced economies that have been at the ZLB since the Great Financial Crisis
of 2007-2009, and are expected to remain there for many years or even decades
to come. Therefore, I explore an alternative ‘old Keynesian’ fiscal policy in which
government spending endogenously responds to inflation and the output gap, while
the nominal interest rate is pegged at the ZLB. I do so within the class of otherwise
standard New Keynesian models.
Figure 1 provides a strong indication that financial markets expect short-term
interest rates in the Eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom to remain at or
close to the ZLB for many years to come. Specifically, Figure 1a shows that yields
on government bonds increase by less than 1% when moving from a maturity of less
than one year to a maturity of 30 years. At the same time, their level remains below
1% even for debt with a maturity of 30 years. Figure 1b shows the instantaneous
forward rate that is implied by the yield curves in Figure 1a. This forward rate can
be understood as the future short-term interest rate expected by financial markets.
Figure 1b clearly shows that future short-term interest rates in the Eurozone are
not expected to increase above 0.2% during the next 30 years, while they will
only temporarily increase above 1% in the United Kingdom, and then revert back
below 0.5%. This implies that financial markets expect these economies to remain
at or close to the ZLB for the next 30 years. Ofcourse, developments between
today and 30 years could easily get these economies away from the ZLB, in which
case the ZLB turns out to be temporarily binding ex post, a situation that is
adequately described by existing models in the literature (Christiano et al., 2011;
Eggertsson, 2011). What is relevant for this paper, however, is that economic
agents currently expect short-term interest rates to be permanently at the ZLB,
and given Figures 1a and 1b that case can clearly be made. In addition, the fact
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that Japan has actually been at the ZLB for almost 30 years provides further proof
that a (almost) permanent ZLB is a realistic possibility.











Instantaneous forward rate (%)
(a)











Instantaneous forward rate (%)
(b)
Figure 1: The left figure displays yield curves for the euro area (blue, solid), the United
Kingdom (red, slotted), and Japan (black, dashed). The right figure displays the instan-
taneous forward curve for the euro area and the United Kingdom, which is the short-term
(instantaneous) interest rate for future periods that is implied in the yield curve. Matu-
rity is in years. Sources: European Central Bank, Bank of England, Ministry of Finance
Japan.
In this paper I investigate within the class of standard New Keynesian models
whether endogenous government spending can stabilize the macroeconomy when
the nominal interest rate is pegged at the ZLB. Within such a framework, several
more specific questions arise: is it possible to replicate the equilibrium that would
arise under an active Taylor rule through an appropriate choice of the government
spending rule? What type of spending rules generate a unique stable equilib-
rium? Does the answer to this question depend on whether I employ a standard
representative agent version of the New Keynesian model or an overlapping gen-
erations version? Is there a fiscal equivalent to the ‘monetary’ divine coincidence
(Blanchard and Gaĺı, 2007; Gaĺı, 2015)?
To answer these questions, I employ the standard Representative Agent New
Keynesian (RANK) model, as well as a two-period Overlapping Generations New
Keynesian (OLG-NK) model. Both model versions feature pricing rigidities a la
? and government spending that is financed by issuing one-period bonds and by
levying lump sum taxes. The OLG-NK model is closest in spirit to Gaĺı (2014),
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and features a young generation that consumes, provides labor, pays lump sum
taxes, and saves through government bonds, while the old generation uses gross
repayment of bonds and a government transfer that is linear in output to pay for
consumption and lump sum taxes. I set lump sum taxes on the old equal to their
gross interest payments on government bonds, and thereby eliminate government
debt as a state variable. I do so to ensure analytical tractability. As a result, the
OLG-NK model also features Ricardian equivalence. The production side of the
economy and the government budget constraint turn out to be equivalent under
both models, except for the government transfer to the old generation in the OLG-
NK model. Both model versions do not feature physical capital.
I distinguish between the familiar ‘monetary’ regime in which government
spending is constant and the nominal interest rate follows an active Taylor rule on
the one hand (Taylor (1993); Woodford (2003) and subsequent literature), and a
‘fiscal’ or ‘old Keynesian’ regime in which the nominal interest rate is pegged at the
ZLB, see Figure 1, and government spending endogenously responds to inflation
and the output gap on the other. The linearized version of both models can be
reduced to the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve and an aggregate demand
equation which relates the (expected) output gap to the return difference between
the expected real rate and the natural rate of interest, the market clearing inter-
est rate under perfectly flexible prices (Woodford, 2000). The channel through
which endogenous government spending affects the equilibrium is by changing the
natural rate of interest. Crucially, the natural rate increases within the RANK
model with the difference between today’s and tomorrow’s expected government
spending, whereas it increases with the (weighted) sum of today’s and tomorrow’s
expected government spending within the OLG-NK model.
My first contribution is to show that the equilibrium values of the output gap
and inflation that arise under the monetary regime can be replicated under the
fiscal regime through appropriate choice of the feedback coefficients of inflation and
the output gap on government spending. The resulting government spending rule
turns out to be countercyclical in inflation and the output gap: the government
reduces aggregate demand by reducing spending when inflation and the output gap
are positive and vice versa, just as the central bank reduces aggregate demand by
raising the nominal and real interest rate under the monetary regime. Therefore,
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this result shows that being permanently stuck at the ZLB (in expectation) does
not prevent the government from achieving the equilibrium values of the output
gap and inflation that would arise when conventional monetary policy can be
employed.
However, whereas the resulting countercyclical government spending rule is
consistent with a unique stable equilibrium within the OLG-NK model, it turns
out that this is not the case within the RANK model. To explain the intuition
behind this result, consider a positive productivity shock which initially decreases
the natural rate of interest. As a result, the return difference between the ex-
pected real rate of interest and the natural rate increases, inducing households to
shift from spending to saving. The output gap turns negative, and the economy
features (expected) deflation through the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This, in
turn, raises the expected real rate everything else equal. To have a unique stable
equilibrium, the natural rate must also increase in equilibrium. This, however,
requires that the increase in the natural rate arising from endogenous government
spending must be larger than the initial decrease generated by the productivity
shock. This is only feasible within the OLG-NK model, where the natural rate
increases with the (weighted) sum of today’s and tomorrow’s expected government
spending. Within the RANK model, however, the natural rate only increases with
the difference between today’s and tomorrow’s expected government spending.
Therefore, no unique stable equilibrium with countercyclical government spending
exists. This contrasts with the monetary regime, for which I show that unique
stable equilibria are qualitatively very similar for the RANK and the OLG-NK
model.
My final contribution consists of establishing the existence of a fiscal counter-
part to the ‘monetary’ divine coincidence, which says that employing one policy
instrument (the nominal interest rate) can achieve the double goal of zero infla-
tion and elimination of the output gap (Blanchard and Gaĺı, 2007). While the
monetary divine coincidence is achieved by instantaneously adjusting the nominal
interest one-for-one with changes in the natural rate that arise from exogenous
shocks (Gaĺı, 2015), the fiscal divine coincidence is achieved through endogenous
government spending directly offsetting the changes in the natural rate that arise
from exogenous shocks. Just as in the case of the monetary divine coincidence,
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one policy instrument (government spending) achieves the two simultaneous goals
of zero inflation and elimination of the output gap.
Literature review
First of all my paper is related to the classic IS-LM literature that started with
Hicks (1937) after publication of John Maynard Keynes’ General Theory (Keynes,
1936). This framework encompasses the recommendation of Keynes that fiscal
policy should be expansionary in recessions to mitigate the drop in GDP, while it
should be contractionary in booms (Keynes, 1936). My model also employs fiscal
policy for macroeconomic stabilization, but all stabilization is performed through
changes in government spending, as Ricardian equivalence prevents government
deficits from affecting the equilibrium in both the RANK model and the OLG-NK
model.
Although the primary instrument for macroeconomic stabilization within the
standard New Keynesian model is the nominal interest rate, this instrument is
no longer available when the economy hits the ZLB like in the Great Financial
Crisis of 2007-2009. In response, governments around the world resorted to fiscal
policy to provide additional macroeconomic stimulus. This has inspired a whole
new strand within the New Keynesian literature in which government spending
is increased for as long as the economy is at the ZLB (Christiano et al., 2011;
Eggertsson, 2011; Woodford, 2011; Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012). These papers
differ in two respects from my paper. First, the economy is only temporarily at
the ZLB, and eventually returns to a regime in which monetary policy regains
full potency. Second, the level of government spending depends on the regime
(ZLB vs. no ZLB) but is exogenous within a particular regime. Eggertsson et al.
(2019) explicitly model how an economy can be permanently at the ZLB as a
result of secular stagnation. I, however, perform my analysis within the class of
standard New Keynesian models for two reasons. First, this class of models allows
for analytical tractability, and second, it facilitates the comparison of my fiscal
regime with the standard New Keynesian monetary regime.
A problem with the RANK model is that it features indeterminacy issues at the
(temporarily binding) ZLB (Cochrane, 2017). Within heterogeneous agents models
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such as Hagedorn (2016) and Hagedorn (2018), this problem is eliminated by
specifying fiscal policy in nominal sequences for government spending, government
debt, and taxes. As a result, the present value government budget constraint is
satisfied at all times and for any price level, which in turn adjusts until demand
and supply in the goods market, or equivalently the asset market, are equalized.
Therefore, the indeterminacy of the price level and inflation when monetary policy
is implemented through an interest rate target (Sargent and Wallace, 1975) is
eliminated.
Leeper (1991) identifies under which monetary and fiscal policies a unique
stable equilibrium is feasible within a stochastic representative agent model. He
finds that when the nominal interest rate is pegged to its steady state value, fiscal
policy must be active in the sense that the feedback from government debt to lump
sum taxes does not respond strongly, or not at all, as in the fiscal theory of the
price level (Sims, 1994; Woodford, 1995; Cochrane, 1999). Lump sum taxes in my
model, however, abide by the Bohn (1998) condition, and are therefore passive in
the terminology of Leeper (1991). The reason why unique stable equilibria are still
possible is the fact that government spending is endogenous, unlike the constant
real spending in Leeper (1991). Therefore, fiscal policy can be considered active,
as the fiscal authority does not take the state of government debt into account
when determining how much to spend.
There is also a literature which studies the effects of fiscal policy within endoge-
nous growth models (Barro, 1990; Turnovsky, 1996, 2000; Agénor, 2008; Barseghyan
and Battaglini, 2016). Fiscal policy is endogenous in the sense that government
spending depends on the amount of taxes levied, which in turn depends on ag-
gregate production (Barro, 1990; Agénor, 2008), or on an explicit modeling of the
legislative bargaining process (Barseghyan and Battaglini, 2016). The focus of
most of these papers is on optimal fiscal policy, the fiscal policy that maximizes
long-run growth (Barro, 1990; Turnovsky, 1996, 2000; Agénor, 2008). One excep-
tion is Chari et al. (1994), who study optimal fiscal policy within a business cycle
model, and determine the optimal tax rate on capital and labor by solving the
Ramsey problem. Just as Chari et al. (1994), I focus on business cycle dynamics
rather than long-run dynamics, but I refrain from looking at optimal fiscal policy.
Finally, my paper is also related to the literature with overlapping generation
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models, which started with Samuelson (1958). My overlapping generations model
is closest to Gaĺı (2014), in which there is price stickiness as well. Gaĺı (2014),
however, differs in four important dimensions. First, Gaĺı (2014) features a bubbly
asset. Second, production firms operate for two periods, while my firms are in-
finitely lived to keep the model as comparable with the RANK model as possible.
Third, labor supply is inelastic, while it is endogenous in my setup. Fourth, there
is no government spending.
I describe the model in Section 2, and establish analytical results in Section 3.
I present numerical simulations in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
As the RANK model and its derivations are by now standard in the literature, I
refer the interested reader to Appendix A for the full description of the model, and
immediately present the linearized equations below.
The overlapping generations model is inspired by Gaĺı (2014). Specifically, a
generation lives for two periods, the size of which has mass one and is constant
across time. Each member of a generation has identical preferences, and is re-
ferred to as “the young” in the first period of existence, and as “the old” in the
second period of existence. The young receive income from providing endogenous
labor and ownership of all production firms, which they spend on consumption,
lump sum taxes, and government bonds.1 The old receive a transfer from the
government and the gross repayment of government bonds, which they spend on
consumption and lump sum taxes. Lump sum taxes are levied on both the young
and the old, with lump sum taxes on the old equal to the gross interest payments
on their government bonds (so they are in effect financing their own repayment
of bond holdings), while lump sum taxes on the young respond to the stock of
previous period government debt, thereby satisfying the Bohn (1998) principle.2
1Most OLG models would place ownership of firms with the old rather than the young. Within
my model this would result in a negatively sloped New Keynesian Phillips curve, which I think
is unrealistic. Instead, I place firm ownership at the young.
2By choosing lump sum taxes in this way, I am capable of eliminating the beginning-of-period
stock of government debt as a state variable. This is necessary for my theoretical analysis, as
otherwise I am not capable of deriving a closed-form expression for the natural level of output in
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The government budget constraint is the same as in the RANK-model, except that
the government makes a transfer to the old that is linear in current output. The
production sector is identical to that in the RANK model, except that ownership is
in the hands of the young and transferred to the next generation when the young
turn old. Therefore, production firms discount future profits using a stochastic
discount factor that features the marginal utility of future young generations.
Both the RANK and the OLG-NK model do not feature physical capital to
keep the models analytically tractable. Unless otherwise stated, the only exogenous
shock in the main text is a productivity shock that follows a regular AR(1) process.
A full specification of both models can be found in Appendix A and B.
2.1 The Representative Agent New Keynesian (RANK)
model
I start by linearizing the standard representative agent New Keynesian model in
Appendix A, which can eventually be described by two familiar equations. These
are the New Keynesian Phillips curve and the aggregated Euler equation which I
will refer to as the aggregate demand equation:
π̂t = βEt [π̂t+1] + κỹt, (1)





where x̂t denotes the percentage deviation of variable xt from its steady state.
ỹt ≡ ŷt− ŷnt denotes the output gap, which is the difference between output under
the New Keynesian model ŷt and output under perfectly flexible prices ŷ
n
t . σ
denotes households’ coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ȳ and c̄ denote the
steady state level of output and consumption, respectively. The factor ȳ/c̄ arises
because output is not only absorbed by consumption, but also by government
terms of the exogenous state variables. This, in turn, is necessary to obtain analytical expressions
for my model economy that feature the output gap rather than the level of output, which is a key
variable in the New Keynesian literature that studies monetary policy (Gaĺı, 2015). However,
setting lump sum taxes in this way without providing a government transfer would leave the
old with zero income after lump sum taxes, and therefore with zero consumption in equilibrium.
This motivates the introduction of the government transfer which ensures positive consumption
by the old.
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spending. rt ≡ R̂nt − Et [π̂t+1] is the expected real interest rate, where R̂nt denotes
the percentage deviation of the nominal interest rate from its steady state value,
while R̂∗t denotes the natural rate of interest (Woodford, 2000), which can be






These two components are given by:
R̂z,∗t = −σ (ȳ/c̄)
(
1 + ϕ
σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ
)
(1− ρz) ẑt, (4)
R̂g,∗t = σ (ȳ/c̄)
(
(ḡ/ȳ)ϕ
σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ
)
(ĝt − Et [ĝt+1]) , (5)
where ẑt denotes the exogenous productivity shock, ϕ the inverse Frisch elastic-
ity, and ḡ the steady state level of government spending. The term ĝt − Et [ĝt+1]
arises from the fact that the aggregate demand equation is derived from the house-
holds’ Euler equation, which features today’s and tomorrow’s expected consump-
tion. Through substitution of the (linearized version of the) aggregate resource
constraint yt = ct + gt, these terms introduce today’s and tomorrow’s expected
government spending on opposite sides of the equality sign.
A key observation is that the natural rate of interest is no longer exogenous
when government spending endogenously responds to inflation and the output gap,
as will be the case below. In fact, changing the natural rate of interest is the key
channel through which government spending affects the equilibrium of the econ-
omy (1) - (2), as government spending does not show up at other places in these
equations. This marks a key difference with the textbook case, in which macroeco-
nomic stabilization is performed through adjustment of the nominal interest rate
(Woodford, 2003; Gaĺı, 2015).
Before I continue, I discuss the intuition behind the above expressions for the
natural rate of interest, where we remember that the natural rate is the equilibrium
interest rate in a model with perfectly flexible prices. We see from equation (4)
that a temporary positive productivity shock reduces the natural rate of interest
(assuming constant government spending). Given an AR(1) process for productiv-
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ity, a positive shock implies that productivity will be higher today than tomorrow.
As such, households know that today’s income will be higher than tomorrow’s,
everything else equal. To smooth consumption over time, households would like to
save part of the additional income that the positive productivity shock generates
today by buying additional government bonds. However, the supply of bonds does
not increase, while the supply of final goods increases as a result of the productiv-
ity shock. The only way to clear both the bond market and the goods market is
through a fall in the equilibrium interest rate (Walsh, 2010).
Next, we see from equation (5) that a positive government spending shock
increases the natural rate of interest. Higher government spending increases the
demand for final goods as well as the supply of government bonds. To induce
households to reduce consumption and increase savings so that equilibrium in
goods and bond markets can be achieved, the natural rate of interest must increase.
However, an interesting observation is the fact that this natural rate increases
with ĝt − Et [ĝt+1]. As such, expected government spending tomorrow reduces
the natural rate of interest today: an increase in future government spending
reduces households’ life-time income, everything else equal, and therefore future
consumption. In response, households would like to save more today to smooth
consumption over time, which increases the demand for government bonds. As
today’s supply of bonds is not directly affected by expected spending tomorrow, the
natural rate of interest must decrease to achieve equilibrium in the bond market.
As such, the fact that the natural rate depends on ĝt−Et [ĝt+1] causes a persistent
government spending shock to increase the natural rate by less than when the
natural rate only depends on ĝt (Walsh, 2010).
2.2 Overlapping Generations New Keynesian Model (OLG-
NK)
Next, I discuss the two-period OLG-NK model. The derivations of the nonlinear
first order conditions, and the resulting set of linearized equations can be found in
Appendix B. I show that the New Keynesian Phillips curve is the same as in the
RANK-model (1). However, the aggregate demand equation changes. To derive it,
I start from the young’s (linearized) Euler equation which determines how much
11
to consume and how much to save through government bonds:




+ R̂nt − Et [π̂t+1] , (6)
where ĉ1t and ĉ
2
t denote consumption of the young and old, respectively. Both the
young and old’s coefficient of relative risk aversion is σ.
To arrive at an aggregate demand equation in terms of inflation and the output
gap, I substitute a linearized version of the old’s budget constraint c2t = st =
(s̄/ȳ) yt, where st denotes the government transfer to the old, and s̄/ȳ the steady
state transfer in terms of steady state output.3 In addition, I employ a linearized
version of the aggregate resource constraint c1t = yt−c2t−gt = (1− c̄2/ȳ) yt−gt, and
an analytical expression for the natural level of output to arrive at the following
aggregate demand equation, a detailed mathematical derivation of which can be











Compared with the representative agent version of the aggregate demand equa-
tion (2), we see that the coefficients in front of ỹt and Et [ỹt+1] are not the same
anymore, which is a result of the fact that the young and old have different budget
constraints. As such, the different numerical values of these two coefficients will at
least quantitatively affect the young’s savings decision with respect to the savings
decision of the representative household in the RANK model.
Although R̂∗t can still be decomposed into the two components of expression
(3), the resulting expressions change with respect to their counterparts (4) and (5)

























 (ϕĝt + σEt [ĝt+1]) , (9)
3Remember that the old generation’s lump sum taxes exactly equal their gross interest pay-
ments on government bonds so that their consumption equals the government transfer.
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Comparing the new expression for the natural rate of interest arising from produc-
tivity shocks with the equivalent expression in the RANK model, we see that the
response will qualitatively be the same as in the RANK model. The young under-
stand that an AR(1) productivity process implies that income today increases by
more than income tomorrow ceteris paribus, which increases their desire to save.
To achieve clearing in bond and goods market, the natural rate of interest must
come down.
The key difference with the natural rate of interest within the RANK model,
however, is the component that arises from government spending, expression (9).
Compared with the equivalent expression in the RANK-model (5), today’s and to-
morrow’s expected government spending terms are now additive (ϕĝt+σEt [ĝt+1]),
rather than subtractive (ĝt − Et [ĝt+1]). The reason for this sign switch has to do
with the term relating to tomorrow’s expected consumption by the representative
agent and the young, respectively. Whereas tomorrow’s expected consumption
by the representative agent is substituted by the difference between output and
government spending in the RANK model, tomorrow’s expected consumption by
today’s young is substituted by the government transfer in the OLG-NK model,
which is linear in output alone.
As a result of today’s and tomorrow’s expected government spending being
additive, the same persistent government spending shock increases the natural
rate of interest by more in the OLG-NK model than in the RANK model. In
addition, a more persistent spending shock leads to a larger change in the natural
rate, everything else equal. This sharply contrasts with the RANK model, where
more persistent shocks lead to a smaller change in the natural rate. Therefore,
government spending is more powerful in changing the natural rate of interest in
the OLG-NK model, and will therefore likely be a more effective tool in stabilizing
the macroeconomy.
2.3 The different policy regimes
In this subsection I specify the two regimes that I study in this paper. These
consist of the regular monetary regime that is typically studied in the literature
(see Woodford (2003) and Gaĺı (2015), for example), and the fiscal regime that I
13
define below.
Specifically, the monetary regime is defined by government spending being
equal to its steady state value, i.e. ĝt = 0, and an active Taylor rule for the
nominal interest rate (Taylor, 1993):
R̂nt = κππ̂t + κyỹt, (10)
which satisfies the Taylor principle κπ > 1 and κy ≥ 0. Therefore, macroeconomic
stabilization is performed by adjusting the nominal interest, which in turn changes
the expected real interest rate. Both within the RANK model, as well as the OLG-
NK model, the natural rate only features the exogenous productivity component,
since ĝt = 0 across time.
The fiscal regime is captured by a nominal interest rate that is equal to its
steady state value, i.e. R̂nt = 0, while government spending is given by:
ĝt = gππ̂t + gyỹt. (11)
Under this regime, macroeconomic stabilization is performed by adjusting the
natural rate of interest. At the same time, the nominal interest rate is no longer
employed for stabilization.
2.4 The aggregate demand equation under the fiscal regime
I end the current section by substituting the government spending rule under the
fiscal regime (11) into the aggregate demand equation and discuss the resulting
expressions. This will help us understand some of the (analytical) results in the
next sections.
2.4.1 The RANK model
Substitution of the endogenous government spending rule (11) into the component
of the natural rate of interest arising from government spending (5) gives the
following expression:






where B is given by:
B = σ (ȳ/c̄)
(
(ḡ/ȳ)ϕ
σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ
)
> 0, (13)
while R̂π,∗t and R̂
y,∗
t are given by:
R̂π,∗t = Bgπ (π̂t − Et [π̂t+1]) , (14)
R̂y,∗t = Bgy (ỹt − Et [ỹt+1]) , (15)
Expression (12) shows that an endogenous natural rate changes in response to
the difference between inflation today and expected inflation tomorrow, as well
as to the difference between the output gap today and the expected output gap
tomorrow. This marks a significant contrast with the monetary regime, in which
the nominal interest rate only responds to changes in today’s level of inflation and
the output gap.
To enhance our understanding of the results in the next sections, I substitute
expression (12) into the aggregate demand equation (2), and rearrange the term
of the natural rate that is related to the output gap (15):
(σ (ȳ/c̄)−Bgy) ỹt = (σ (ȳ/c̄)−Bgy)Et [ỹt+1]−
(





The resulting structure of the above equation is the same as under the monetary
regime: we have the current output gap on the left hand side, and the expected
output gap and the difference between the expected real rate and the natural rate
on the right hand side. A key difference however, is the coefficient σ (ȳ/c̄) − Bgy
in front of both output gaps. While this coefficient is unambiguously positive
under the monetary regime (in which case B = 0 and R̂π,∗t = 0), we see that this
coefficient switches sign and becomes negative when gy > σ (ȳ/c̄) /B. In that case,
the response of inflation and the output gap to a productivity shock will not only
be affected quantitatively, but also qualitatively. For the moment I leave it at
this observation, but I will revisit this issue after having inspected the stability
properties of the fiscal regime, and its dynamic response to a productivity shock
in Section 4.
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2.4.2 The OLG-NK model
Next, I inspect the aggregate demand equation for the OLG-NK model. Just as
in the RANK model, I start by substituting the government spending rule (11)
into the component of the natural rate that arises from government spending (9)
within the OLG-NK model:
R̂g,∗t = B










> 0, while R̂π,∗t and R̂
y,∗
t are given by
R̂π,∗t = B
∗gπ (ϕπ̂t + σEt [π̂t+1]) , (18)
R̂y∗t = B
∗gy (ϕỹt + σEt [ỹt+1]) , (19)
Hence we see from expression (17) that the endogenous natural rate will not change
in response to the difference between today’s and tomorrow’s expected inflation
and output gap (as in the RANK model), but rather to the (weighted) sum of
today’s and tomorrow’s expected inflation and output gap.
Next, I substitute the expression for the natural rate of interest arising from








ỹt = σ (1 +B
∗gy)Et [ỹt+1]−
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Just as in the case of the RANK model, the structure of the equation is the same
as under the monetary regime, for which B∗ = 0 and R̂π,∗t = 0. However, we see
that endogenous government spending affects the aggregate demand equation in a
fundamentally different way than in the RANK model. Whereas the coefficients in
front of the output gaps are the same within the RANK model and affected by the
inclusion of endogenous government spending in a symmetric way (see equation
(16)), we see that these coefficients are affected in an asymmetric way within




In this section I establish three analytical results. First, I show for both the RANK
and the OLG-NK model that the equilibrium values for inflation and the output
gap under the monetary regime can be replicated under the fiscal regime through
an appropriate mapping from the monetary feedback coefficients κπ and κy to the
government spending feedback coefficients gπ and gy. This shows that endogenous
government spending can ensure that the same equilibrium arises as in the case
where the ZLB is not binding, and conventional monetary policy is employed for
macroeconomic stabilization.
Second, I show that such a countercyclical equilibrium is not unique in the
RANK model and that multiple other equilibria exist. This result implies that the
RANK model might not be the right framework to explore the consequences of an
old-fashioned Keynesian fiscal policy.
Finally, I show the existence of a fiscal counterpart to the ‘monetary’ divine
coincidence in both the RANK and the OLG-NK model. The divine coincidence
denotes the concept that the New Keynesian Phillips curve (1) allows for one policy
instrument to simultaneously achieve the two goals of i) hitting the central bank’s
inflation target, and ii) setting the output gap equal to zero (Blanchard and Gaĺı,
2007).
3.1 Equivalence between monetary and fiscal equilibrium
I start by analytically calculating the impulse response functions to a productivity
shock using the method of undetermined coefficients. I do so for both the monetary
and the fiscal regime, see Appendix A.11 for the RANK model and Appendix
B.10 for the OLG-NK model. Doing so will allow me to show that the equilibrium
values for inflation and the output gap that arise under the monetary regime can be
replicated under the fiscal regime through an appropriate choice of the government
spending coefficients gπ and gy in terms of the monetary feedback coefficients κπ
and κy.
Proposition 1. An equivalence exists between the equilibrium allocations for in-
flation and the output gap under the monetary and fiscal regime through an appro-
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priate choice of gπ and gy in terms of the monetary feedback coefficients κπ and
κy.
Proof. In Appendix A.11, I show for the RANK model that the following mapping
between the monetary policy coefficients κπ and κy and the government spending
coefficients gπ and gy results in the exact same equilibrium allocations for inflation
and the output gap in response to productivity shocks:
κπ = −B (1− ρz) gπ, (21)
κy = −B (1− ρz) gy, (22)
In Appendix B.10 I show the equivalent mapping for the OLG-NK model, which
is given by:
κπ = −B∗ (σρz + ϕ) gπ, (23)
κy = −B∗ (σρz + ϕ) gy, (24)
The economic intuition behind this result is straightforward and can be ex-
plained by considering a positive productivity shock that decreases inflation and
the output gap. Under the monetary regime, the central bank reduces the nom-
inal and real interest rate to increase aggregate demand. As a result, inflation
and the output gap increase with respect to the initial decrease that resulted from
the productivity shock. To achieve the same equilibrium under the fiscal regime,
the government also has to increase aggregate demand, which is now achieved by
raising government spending.
Interestingly, the above proposition implies that countries, which are currently
stuck at the ZLB and predicted to remain there for many years to come, are
(theoretically) not in any way limited by their inability to employ conventional
monetary policy; they can simply employ government spending to achieve their
desired levels of inflation and output gap. Given these results, it is interesting to
observe that Japan has employed fiscal policy much more aggressively in recent
years. And although it has not been able to bring inflation back to its target of
18
2%, Blanchard and Tashiro (2019) suggest that it has been able to close the output
gap.4
3.2 The impossibility of a unique stable countercyclical
spending equilibrium within the RANK model
Above we saw that the equilibrium under the monetary regime can be replicated
under the fiscal regime through an appropriate choice of the feedback coefficients
of inflation and output gap on government spending. However, the fact that an
equilibrium is feasible does not guarantee that it is stable and unique. In fact, I
show in the next proposition that a unique stable equilibrium is not feasible in the
RANK model for any countercyclical government spending rule with gπ < 0 and
gy < 0.
Proposition 2. There is no unique stable equilibrium in the RANK model for
countercyclical government spending (gπ < 0 and gy < 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.10.1.
I postpone explaining the intuition behind this result to the next section, as
it is more easily understood with the help of numerical simulations. However,
I can already conclude that while the RANK model is the workhorse model for
studying monetary policy (Woodford (2003) and subsequent literature), it might
not be the right framework for analysis of an active countercyclical government
spending policy in an economy that is (almost) permanently at the ZLB, such as,
for example, Japan during the last 30 years. The reason is that there is a broad
consensus among policymakers and academics since Keynes (1936) that fiscal pol-
icy should be conducted countercyclically when it is employed for macroeconomic
stabilization.
3.3 The ‘fiscal’ divine coincidence
Next, I prove the existence of the ‘fiscal’ divine coincidence. To do so, I assume the
government can instantaneously observe the productivity shock, and can directly
4Ofcourse, Japan has also aggressively employed unconventional monetary policies such as
quantitative easing, so this outcome cannot be attributed to fiscal policy alone.
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adjust spending in response:
ĝt = Az ẑt + gππ̂t + gyỹt. (25)
Such a rule is in line with the proof of the divine coincidence under the mone-
tary regime (Gaĺı, 2015), in which the nominal interest rate responds directly to
productivity shocks. I am now ready to prove the existence of the fiscal divine
coincidence.
Proposition 3. There exists a ‘fiscal’ divine coincidence equilibrium with π̂t = 0
and ỹt = 0 across time.
Proof. An equilibrium with π̂t = 0 and ỹt = 0 across time requires that R̂
∗
t = 0
period by period. Substitution of equation (25) into equation (3) allows me to
solve for Az such that R̂
∗
t = 0 for any shock ẑt within the RANK model. This is





Similarly, I substitute the government spending rule (25) into equation (7) to find



















− ρz > 0.5
Hence we see that in both models government spending has to increase in
response to a positive productivity shock to absorb the initial lack of demand for
final goods that arises from households’ increased desire to save, see Section 2.
Simultaneously, the extra bonds issued to finance additional government spending

















− ρz > 0.
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satisfy households’ increased desire to save, preventing the natural rate from having
to fall to clear the bond market. As a result, the natural rate does not change in
equilibrium, and inflation is at target while the output gap is zero.
The divine coincidence is an important concept as it provides the theoretical
underpinning for inflation targeting: by making sure that inflation is at target,
central bankers automatically ensure that output is at the efficient level of out-
put in the absence of real imperfections (Blanchard and Gaĺı, 2007), with the
efficient level of output being equal to the level of output a social planner would
choose. However, most central bankers believe such real imperfections to exist, and
therefore experience a short-run trade-off between hitting the inflation target and
stabilization of the output gap, the gap between the actual level of output and the
efficient level of output. Still, the divine coincidence is an important theoretical
concept that underpins the concept of medium-run inflation targeting (Goodfriend
and King, 1997).
Therefore, it is interesting to know that such a divine coincidence is not only
restricted to the case where conventional monetary policy is employed for macroe-
conomic stabilization, but also exists when endogenous government spending is
employed at the ZLB. Ofcourse, the same real imperfections that prevent the
short-run divine coincidence to exist under the monetary regime in the real world,
will also prevent a short-run divine coincidence to exist within the fiscal regime.
At the same time, however, it tells us that it is (theoretically) possible for the
fiscal authority to achieve the efficient level of output in the medium run by en-
suring that the inflation target is met using government spending as the policy
instrument.
4 Numerical results
In this section, I numerically investigate the RANK and the OLG-NK model. I
begin by investigating the stability properties of the RANK model, and show the
regions for which this model has a unique and stable equilibrium. Then I show the
impulse response functions to a productivity shock, which will allow me to explain
why a unique stable equilibrium with procyclical government spending exists in
the RANK model. I will then perform the same analysis for the OLG-NK model,
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which will allow me to highlight the differences with the RANK model that allow
for a unique stable countercyclical equilibrium to exist.
4.1 Calibration
The numerical analysis is meant to illustrate the qualitative properties of the
model, rather than perform a quantitative analysis for a particular country. There-
fore, all parameters have numerical values that are typical within the New Keyne-
sian literature.
I set the steady state nominal interest rate equal to zero to capture an economy
that is at the ZLB in the long run. I also set steady state net inflation equal to zero.
As a result, the steady state real interest rate must be zero as well, which is achieved
by setting the subjective discount factor equal to 1. The coefficient of relative risk
aversion and the inverse Frisch elasticity are both set to 1. The elasticity of
substitution is set to 10, implying a steady state markup of 11%, while the Calvo-
probability is set to 0.75. I set steady state government spending over GDP equal
to 0.2. As both the RANK model and the OLG-NK model feature Ricardian
equivalence, steady state debt-GDP does not affect the equilibrium allocation,
and therefore does not need to be chosen. Steady state consumption of the old
is 40% of steady state output within the OLG-NK model to make sure that the
steady state nominal interest rate is also zero in the OLG-NK model. The AR(1)
coefficient for productivity is 0.95, while the standard deviation is equal to 0.01.
These parameter values result in B = 1/9 and B∗ = 1/5. A table with numerical
values can be found in Appendix C.
4.2 Stability in the RANK model
I start by investigating for which values of gπ and gy a unique stable equilibrium
exists within the RANK model. I do so by calculating the roots for the system
that consists of equations (1) and (16) with R̂nt = 0. The results can be found in
Figure 2, where the blue plus sign denotes a unique stable equilibrium, while the
red cross sign represents a combination for which multiple equilibria exist.6
6Note that the system consisting of equations (1) and (16) contains two forward-looking vari-
ables. As such, there are no explosive equilibria, and we either have a unique stable equilibrium
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From Figure 2 we see that a unique stable equilibrium only exists for strictly
positive coefficients gy > 0 and gπ > 0. In fact, it turns out that gy > σ (ȳ/c̄) /B
for every unique stable equilibrium, something that will turn out to be important
below.
These results confirm the analytical result from Section 3.2 that a unique stable
equilibrium does not exist when government spending is countercyclical in both
inflation and the output gap. Before I move on to study the stability properties
of the OLG-NK model, however, it is useful to investigate the impulse response
functions of the RANK model to a positive productivity shock for a combination
of gπ and gy that features a unique stable equilibrium. This will eventually help
to understand why a countercyclical unique stable equilibrium is not feasible.
Figure 2: Stability properties of the RANK model under the fiscal regime. The
horizontal axis features the output coefficient gy and the vertical axis the inflation
coefficient gπ. A unique, stable equilibrium exists for combinations of gπ and gy
that have a blue plus sign, while the combinations that feature multiple equilibria
are denoted with a red cross.
or multiple equilibria (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).
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4.3 Dynamic response to productivity shock in the RANK
model
To follow up on the theoretical analysis of Section 3 and the stability properties
I found in the previous subsection, I investigate the RANK economy’s impulse
response functions to a productivity shock for a combination of gπ and gy for
which a unique stable equilibrium exists. Specifically, I investigate in Figure 3 the
impact of a positive productivity shock of 1%, and compare the response under
the monetary regime (blue, solid) with that under the fiscal regime with gπ = 10
and gy = 20 (red, slotted).
Strikingly, we see that inflation and the output gap have opposite signs under
the monetary and fiscal regime. Meanwhile, the expected real interest rate rt =
R̂nt − Et [π̂t+1] and the natural rate of interest (3) have the same sign. They
both decrease in response to the productivity shock. Also observe that there is
a small quantitative difference in the natural rate of interest between the two
regimes, which is caused by endogenous government spending. Therefore, changes
in government spending have a relatively minor influence on the natural rate, and
most of the change in the natural rate is driven by the exogenous productivity
component (4).
To better understand these results, I will first revisit the aggregate demand
equation under the monetary regime, and subsequently discuss it under the fiscal
regime. Despite the fact that the monetary regime is well known from the litera-
ture (Gaĺı (2015) for example), revisiting it allows me to compare and contrast it
with the fiscal regime, which in turn will help us understand the counterintuitive
response of inflation and the output gap.
The aggregate demand equation under the standard monetary regime is given
by:





In this equation, a positive productivity shock reduces the natural rate of interest
R̂z,∗t which increases the return difference between the expected real rate rt and
the natural rate R̂z,∗t . As a result, households shifts from spending to saving with
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Figure 3: Figure displaying the impulse response functions to a 1% positive pro-
ductivity shock in the RANK model (percentage deviation from steady state). The
monetary regime with κπ = 1.5 and κy = 0.125 is denoted by the blue, solid line,
while the fiscal regime with gπ = 10 and gy = 20 is denoted by the red, slotted
line. Time is on the horizontal axis, and is measured in quarters. “Expected real
rate” refers to the variable rt = R̂
n
t −Et [π̂t+1]. The variable “Natural rate” refers
to equation (3), “Natural rate (z)” corresponds to equation (4), while “Natural
rate (g)” refers to (5).
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respect to the flexible prices equilibrium, resulting in a negative output gap. The
term σ (ȳ/c̄) determines the degree to which spending today is reduced with re-
spect to the flexible prices equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, we see that the size of the
negative output gap depends on households’ intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion 1/σ: the larger this elasticity (the smaller σ), the larger households’ desire to
reduce spending today and increase savings, resulting in a more negative output
gap, everything else equal. A negative output gap today results in (expected) de-
flation through the New Keynesian Phillips curve (1), which decreases the nominal
and real interest rate through the Taylor rule. This, in turn, (partially) offsets the
initial increase in the return difference between the expected real rate rt and the
natural rate R̂z,∗t that resulted from the productivity shock, allowing for a unique
stable equilibrium to emerge.
Next, I move to the fiscal regime, and study the resulting aggregate demand
equation (16) that was derived in Section 2.4:
(σ (ȳ/c̄)−Bgy) ỹt = (σ (ȳ/c̄)−Bgy)Et [ỹt+1]−
(





This expression allows me to explain why a shock that initially increases the return
difference between the expected rate of interest rt and the natural rate R̂
∗
t results
in a positive output gap and inflation, see Figure 3. Previously, the increase in the
return difference would generate a shift from spending to saving. This desire to
save, however, is now more than offset by a change in the natural rate arising from
a change in the output gap (captured by Bgy), since gy > σ (ȳ/c̄) /B. As a result,
households shift from saving to spending instead, resulting in a positive output
gap in equilibrium. The additional purchases generate inflation through the New
Keynesian Phillips curve (1), which drives down the expected real interest rate
rt = −Et [π̂t+1]. The increase in the endogenous part of the natural rate and the
decrease in the expected real interest rate offset the initial increase in the return
difference between the expected real rate and the natural rate, thereby giving rise
to a unique stable equilibrium.
Now that I have explained the economic intuition behind the impulse response
functions of the procyclical unique equilibrium in the RANK model, I move on to
investigate the OLG-NK model. In doing so, it will finally become clear why a
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countercyclical unique stable equilibrium is not feasible within the RANK model.
4.4 The OLG-NK model
In the previous section I numerically investigated the RANK model, and was
able to draw two conclusions. First, government spending needs to be procyclical
within the RANK model for a unique stable equilibrium to exist. Second, the
sign of the response of the output gap and inflation switch with respect to the
monetary regime in such a procyclical equilibrium. In this section, I turn my
attention to the OLG-NK model. I will investigate for what values of gπ and gy a
unique stable equilibrium exists, as well as the impulse response functions to the
same productivity shock as in the previous section.
First, I investigate in Figure 4 the stability properties of the OLG-NK model.
Just as in the RANK model, the output coefficient gy is on the horizontal axis,
while the inflation coefficient gπ on the vertical. The combinations with a blue
plus sign indicate a unique stable equilibrium, whereas the red crosses indicate
the existence of multiple equilibria. From the figure we see that the inflation
coefficient can never be positive, while the output coefficient can at most be zero.
Therefore, a unique stable equilibrium is only feasible when government spending is
countercyclical. As it is the current consensus among policymakers and academics
since Keynes (1936) that fiscal policy should be countercyclical when employed for
macroeconomic stabilization, the OLG-NK model is clearly to be preferred over
the RANK model.
To understand why government spending has to be countercyclical, I turn to
Figure 5, in which I investigate the impulse response functions for the OLG-NK
model to the same positive productivity shock as in Figure 3. The blue solid IRFs
display the monetary regime, whereas the red slotted IRFs display the fiscal regime
with feedback coefficients gπ = −10 and gy = −10. Interestingly, we see that the
output gap and inflation now have the same sign as under the monetary regime, a
result that strongly contrasts with the RANK model. Instead, we see that the sign
of the expected real interest rate rt = −Et [π̂t+1] and the natural rate R̂∗t switch
with respect to that under the monetary regime. This also differs from the RANK
model, where the expected real interest rate and the natural rate had the same
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Figure 4: Stability properties of the OLG-NK model under the fiscal regime. The
horizontal axis features the output coefficient gy and the vertical axis the inflation
coefficient gπ. A unique, stable equilibrium exists for combinations of gπ and gy
that have a blue plus sign, while the combinations that feature multiple equilibria
are denoted with a red cross.
sign as under the monetary regime, and the quantitative difference between the
natural rate of the two regimes was small.
To enhance our understanding behind these results, I first study the mone-












A comparison with the aggregate demand equation under the monetary regime in
the RANK model (28) shows that the two equations are qualitatively the same,
and only differ to the extent that the coefficients in front of today’s output gap
ỹt and tomorrow’s expected output gap Et [ỹt+1] are quantitatively different. As
a result, the impulse response functions of the RANK model and the OLG-NK
model are qualitatively the same (compare the blue solid lines in Figure 3 on the
one hand with the blue solid lines in Figure 5 on the other). Therefore the intuition
behind the impulse response functions under the monetary regime of the RANK
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Figure 5: Figure displaying the impulse response functions to a 1% positive pro-
ductivity shock in the OLG-NK model (percentage deviation from steady state).
The monetary regime with κπ = 1.5 and κy = 0.125 is denoted by the blue, solid
line, while the fiscal regime with gπ = −10 and gy = −10 is denoted by the red,
slotted line. Time is on the horizontal axis, and is measured in quarters. “Ex-
pected real rate” refers to the variable rt = R̂
n
t −Et [π̂t+1]. The variable “Natural
rate” refers to equation (3), “Natural rate (z)” corresponds to equation (8), while
“Natural rate (g)” refers to (9).
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model is similar to that under the monetary regime of the OLG-NK model.
Now I turn my attention to the fiscal regime under the OLG-NK model, and








ỹt = σ (1 +B
∗gy)Et [ỹt+1]−
(





The first observation from the above equation is that countercyclical government
spending gy < 0 increases the coefficient in front of the current output gap ỹt
with respect to the monetary regime, while it decreases the coefficient in front of
tomorrow’s expected output gap. As a result, the same exogenous shock will lead
to a smaller change in the current output gap with respect to the monetary regime,
as we see in Figure 5. However, as the sign of the coefficient in front of today’s
output gap ỹt does not change with respect to the monetary regime, the sign of the
impulse response functions for the output gap and inflation do not change under
the fiscal regime.
The economic intuition behind the smaller change in the output gap is the
fact that a countercyclical government spending rule raises the natural rate when
the output gap is negative, and thereby induces households to shift from saving
to spending, everything else equal, which together with the extra government
spending reduces the (negative) output gap.
However, the same reasoning regarding the sign of the impulse response func-
tions applies for a countercyclical feedback coefficient gy < 0 in the RANK model.
Why then, is a unique stable countercyclical equilibrium feasible in the OLG-
NK model and not in the RANK model? The short answer is that the natural
rate responds strongly to government spending in the OLG-NK model, where it
changes with the (weighted) sum of today’s and tomorrow’s expected government
spending, while the natural rate responds weakly in the RANK model, where it
changes with the difference between today’s and tomorrow’s expected government
spending. As a result, endogenous government spending in the OLG-NK model is
capable of switching the sign of the natural rate with respect to the initial change
caused by the exogenous shock.
This sign switch becomes very clear by comparing the equilibrium natural rate
of interest under the monetary and fiscal regime in Figure 5 (lower left panel), since
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the difference between the two regimes is entirely driven by endogenous government
spending under the fiscal regime. This sharply contrasts with the weak response
of the natural rate in the RANK model (Figure 3), where the difference between
the monetary and fiscal regime is very small.
To highlight why this endogenous sign switch of the natural rate is necessary
for a unique stable countercyclical equilibrium to emerge, I consider again Figure
5. The exogenous productivity shock initially decreases the natural rate of interest,
which in turn increases the return difference between the expected real rate and the
natural rate of interest. Just as under the monetary regime, there is a shift from
spending to saving. A negative output gap emerges, which leads to (expected)
deflation through the New Keynesian Phillips curve (1). This expected deflation
raises the expected real interest rate under the fiscal regime. In order for a unique
stable equilibrium to be feasible, the increase in the expected rate must be partially
offset by an increase of the natural rate of interest. This requires a sign switch of
the natural rate, as the productivity shock initially decreases the natural rate. This
sign switch can only occur within the OLG-NK model, in which the natural rate
increases with the (weighted) sum of today’s and tomorrow’s expected government
spending.
I end this section by observing that the key to generate unique stable counter-
cyclical equilibria is that government spending affects the natural rate sufficiently
strong. Therefore, my specific overlapping generations model will probably not be
the only model that is capable of generating unique stable countercyclical equilib-
ria; any model in which the natural rate responds sufficiently strong to government
spending will probably be capable of doing so.
5 Conclusion
Most of the New Keynesian literature that studies episodes in which the economy
lands at the ZLB, assume it is temporarily binding and that conventional monetary
policy regains full potency after the ZLB-episode has ended (Christiano et al.,
2011; Eggertsson, 2011). However, one can infer from yield curves for the euro
area, Japan, and the United Kingdom that financial markets expect short-term
interest rates to remain at or close to the ZLB for as much as 30 years to come. In
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that case, other instruments such as unconventional monetary policies and fiscal
policy are needed for macroeconomic stabilization. In this paper I investigate one
such policy, namely an ‘old Keynesian’ fiscal policy within the New Keynesian
framework. Specifically, this policy consists of government spending endogenously
responding to inflation and the output gap while I peg the nominal interest rate at
the ZLB. I employ two versions of the New Keynesian framework, both of which
do not feature physical capital. The first is the standard Representative Agent
New Keynesian (RANK) model, while the second is a two-period Overlapping
Generations New Keynesian (OLG-NK) model that is similar in spirit to Gaĺı
(2014).
Both under the standard ‘monetary’ regime, as well as under my ‘fiscal’ or ‘old
Keynesian’ regime, government policy affects the economy through the aggregate
demand equation, which relates the (expected) output gap to the return difference
between the expected real rate and the natural rate of interest, the equilibrium
rate of interest in an economy with perfectly flexible prices. While conventional
monetary policy affects the equilibrium by changing the expected real interest
rate (through adjustment of the nominal rate), government spending affects the
equilibrium by changing the natural rate of interest. A crucial difference between
the RANK and the OLG-NK model is that the natural rate in the RANK model
increases in the difference between today’s and tomorrow’s expected government
spending, whereas it increases in the (weighted) sum of the two in the OLG-NK
model. As such, government spending has a stronger effect on the natural rate in
the OLG-NK model than in the RANK model.
I subsequently find the following results. First, both under the RANK and the
OLG-NK model, the equilibrium values for inflation and the output gap under the
monetary regime can be replicated under the fiscal regime through an appropriate
choice of the feedback coefficients of inflation and the output gap on government
spending. The resulting government spending rule turns out to be countercyclical
in inflation and the output gap. This can be understood by considering a positive
productivity shock that decreases inflation and the output gap. Under the mon-
etary regime, the central bank will reduce the nominal and real interest rate to
increase aggregate demand, thereby increasing inflation and the output gap with
respect to the initial decrease. Under the fiscal regime, the government raises
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aggregate demand by increasing government spending.
My second result is that a unique stable equilibrium with countercyclical gov-
ernment spending is only feasible within the OLG-NK model. Government spend-
ing needs to change the natural rate sufficiently strong such that the initial change
in the natural rate caused by exogenous shocks is more than offset. To understand
why this is necessary, consider a positive productivity shock which initially reduces
the natural rate and therefore increases the return difference between the expected
real rate and the natural rate. This increase in the return difference induces a shift
from spending to saving that generates a negative output gap and (expected) de-
flation, which raises the expected real interest rate. In order to have a unique
stable equilibrium, the increase in the expected real rate must be partially offset
by an increase in the equilibrium natural rate. For that to happen, the increase
in the natural rate arising from endogenous government spending must be larger
than the initial decrease caused by the productivity shock. This, however, is only
feasible within the OLG-NK model, in which the natural rate increases with the
(weighted) sum of today’s and tomorrow’s expected government spending.
Third, I establish the existence of a fiscal counterpart to the ‘monetary’ divine
coincidence (Blanchard and Gaĺı, 2007): when exogenous shocks that affect the
natural rate of interest are instantaneously observed, the government can adjust
government spending in such a way that the change in the natural rate arising
from exogenous shocks is exactly offset by changes in the natural rate arising from
government spending. That allows for an equilibrium in which inflation and the
output gap are permanently equal to zero, which is the efficient allocation in the
absence of real imperfections (Blanchard and Gaĺı, 2007).
My analysis provides two lessons for policymakers. First, a properly chosen
government spending rule can replicate the equilibrium values for inflation and
the output gap that would arise under the conventional monetary regime in the
absence of a ZLB. This implies that policymakers can employ an active government
spending policy to stabilize the business cycle when the economy is (almost) per-
manently at the ZLB. Second, the fact that a countercyclical government spending
rule only generates a unique stable equilibrium in the OLG-NK model and not in
the RANK model implies that the last model might not be adequate for policymak-
ers: ever since Keynes (1936), a broad consensus of academics and policymakers
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have argued that fiscal policy should be employed countercyclically when used for
macroeconomic stabilization. The conclusion that the OLG-NK is to be preferred
over the RANK model sharply contrasts with the standard monetary regime, for
which I find that unique stable equilibria in the RANK and OLG-NK model are
qualitatively very similar.
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Appendix “Old-Keynesianism in the New
Keynesian model”
A Representative Agent New Keynesian (RANK)
model
I employ a standard New-Keynesian model without capital such as can be found
in standard textbook treatments such as Gaĺı (2015). Households consume, supply
labor, and save through one-period nominal government bonds, which pay a nom-
inal interest rate that is set by the central bank. Within my model, the central
bank will set the interest rate equal to its steady state value. The fiscal author-
ity raises revenue from issuing one-period government bonds and lump sum taxes,
while these revenues are spent on government purchases of the final good and gross
interest payments (including the principal) of government bonds issued in the pre-
vious period. Lump sum taxes satisfy the Bohn (1998) principle, which results in
my model satisfying Ricardian equivalence. As is standard in the New Keynesian
literature, the production sector is three-layered. Final goods producers have a
production function that has a constant elasticity of substitution between differ-
ent retail goods. They operate in a perfectly competitive market, and therefore
take prices as given while choosing how many goods to purchase from each retail
goods producer. Retail goods producers require one intermediate good to produce
one retail good, and operate in a market of monopolistic competition. Therefore,
they have the capacity to set prices while taking the demand schedule into account,
resulting in a markup over the intermediate goods. However, they are subject to
? pricing frictions which prevents some retail goods producers to change prices
in a given period. Due to their monopoly power, retail goods producers make
a profit in equilibrium, which is transferred to households. Finally, intermediate
goods producers operate in a perfectly competitive market in which they produce
using a production function that is linear in labor. They hire labor in a perfectly
competitive labor market. As a result, intermediate goods producers take prices
and wages as given, and only determine how much labor to hire in equilibrium.
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A.1 Households
There is a continuum i ∈ [0, 1] of identical households. Each household i receives
income from supplying labor Wtht(i), where Wt is the nominal wage rate, and ht(i)
the number of hours worked. In addition, income is received from gross repayment
of nominal one-period bonds, which can be decomposed in the principalBt−1(i) and
interest Rnt−1Bt−1(i), where R
n
t is the net nominal interest rate set by the central
bank. Finally, households receive income Ωt(i) from profits of firms owned by
household i. Income is spent on consumption Ct(i), purchases of new government
bonds Bt(i), and lump sum taxes Ptτt(i), where Pt is the price level of the final
good. This gives rise to the following nominal budget constraint for household i:




Bt−1(i) + Ωt(i). (30)
Division by the price level Pt results in the following budget constraint in terms
of the final good:





bt−1(i) + ωt(i), (31)
where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate of the price level. Household i maxi-



















where ξt denotes a preference shock. The Lagrangian of household’s imaximization


























bt−1+s(i) + ωt+s(i)− ct+s(i)− bt+s(i)− τt+s(i)
]}
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This results in the following first order conditions:













where βΛt,+s = βλt+s/λt denotes households’ stochastic discount factor.
A.2 Production firms
I explained in the main text that the production sector consists of final goods
producers, retail goods producers, and intermediate goods producers. Below I
show the formal derivations of their first order conditions.
A.2.1 Final goods producers
Final goods producers purchase retail goods yft at price P
f
t from retail goods
producer f ∈ [0, 1], and combine these into final goods yt using the following












where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between two retail goods producers.
There is perfect competition among final goods producers, hence all final goods
producers charge the same price Pt for their final goods. They take demand yt for
final goods as given, and only decide how many retail goods yft to buy from each











subject to the production technology (35). Taking the first order condition with







Substitution of (36) into final goods prodcuers’ production function (35) allows








A.2.2 Retail goods producers
Retail goods producer f ∈ [0, 1] purchases goods yit at a price φt (expressed in
terms of final goods) from intermediate goods producers. He converts these goods
one for one into a unique retail good yft = y
i
t. The fact that retail good f is unique
provides retail goods producer f a monopoly for good f . As mentioned above,
however, due to the fact that final goods producers purchase retail goods from all
retail goods producers, retail goods producer f effectively operates in a market with
monopolistic competition. However, monopolistic competition allows retail goods
producer f to set the price P ft while taking the demand schedule (36) into account,
thereby allowing him to charge a markup over the price φt of intermediate goods.
Retail goods producers, however, are subject to price-stickiness a la ?. This implies
that there is a probability ψ, which is constant across time and cross-section, that
retail goods producer f will not be able to change its nominal price P ft in the
future. Hence retail goods producers do not only maximize current profits, but
also expected future profits when setting a new price P ∗t today. Future expected
profits are discounted using the households’ stochastic discount factor βsΛt,t+s,
as they are the ultimate owners of the retail goods producers. The optimization

















































































































































The price level Pt evolves according to the following law of motion, see (37):
P 1−εt = (1− ψ) (P ∗t )









Lagging by one period, and multiplying by ψ gives the following expression:














Hence I can write the general price level Pt as:
P 1−εt = (1− ψ) (P ∗t )
1−ε + ψP 1−εt−1 . (40)
Division by P 1−εt allows me to express everything in terms of the relative new price
π∗t ≡ P ∗t /Pt and the gross inflation rate πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1:
1 = (1− ψ) (π∗t )
1−ε + ψπε−1t . (41)


























(1− ψ) (P ∗t )





























Hence I find for dispersion Dt the following expression:







= (1− ψ) (π∗t )
−ε + ψπεtDt−1. (42)
A.2.3 Intermediate goods producers




where yit is the number of intermediate goods produced, zt productivity, and h
i
t the
amount of labor hired by intermediate goods producer i. Both the labor market
and the market for intermediate goods are perfectly competitive, and intermediate
goods producers therefore take the wage rate wt and the price of intermediate
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goods φt as given. Intermediate goods producers’ decision problem is static, and






subject to the production technology (43). Taking the derivative with respect to
hit results in the following first order condition:
wt = φtzt, (44)
A.3 Government
A.3.1 Fiscal authority
The fiscal authority raises revenues through lump sum taxes Ptτt on households,
and issuing one period nominal government bonds Bt. Revenues are used to pur-
chase final goods Ptgt, where gt denotes the number of final goods purchased,
and for repayment of principal and interest on debt issued in the previous period(
1 +Rnt−1
)
Bt−1. Hence the nominal government budget constraint is given by:





Division by the price level Pt results in the following government budget constraint
in terms of final goods:






where bt ≡ Bt/Pt is the stock of government debt in real terms. Government
spending is as specified in the main text. I assume that there is a feedback rule
from the stock of government debt on the level of lump sum taxes satisfying the
Bohn (1998) principle:





Therefore, the model satisfies Ricardian equivalence, and as a result the equilib-
rium allocations for lump sum taxes τt and government bonds bt will not affect the
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equilibrium allocation of the other variables. Finally, government spending will
be equal to steady state under the monetary regime, while it will endogenously
respond to inflation and the output gap under the fiscal regime.
A.3.2 Central bank
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate Rnt on government bonds. I assume
that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a standard Taylor
rule under the monetary regime, while the interest rate will be equal its steady
state value under the fiscal regime:
Rnt = R̄n. (48)
A.4 Market clearing
Market clearing occurs when the supply of final goods yt equals demand for final
goods:
yt = ct + gt, (49)
A.5 Aggregation
I start by observing that there is a mass of one of households, each of which makes














Therefore, I can simply replace ct(i) by ct and ht(i) by ht in households’ first order
conditions for consumption and labor supply.

































Therefore, the aggregate equivalent of equation (36) is given by:
Dtyt = ztht. (50)
A.6 Overview first order conditions (RANK)
A compeititve equilibrium is a series of quantities {ct, ht, yt, gt, bt, τt}, (shadow)
prices


















wt = φtzt, (54)























1 = (1− ψ) (π∗t )
1−ε + ψπε−1t . (59)
Dt = (1− ψ) (π∗t )
−ε + ψπεtDt−1. (60)











Rnt = ...., (63)
gt = .... (64)
yt = ct + gt, (65)
log (zt) = ρz log (zt−1) + εz,t, (66)
log (ξt) = ρξ log (ξt−1) + εξ,t, (67)
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where βΛt,t+s ≡ βλt+s/λt denotes the representative households’ stochastic dis-
count factor. In addition, there is a transversality condition for government bonds,
and the process for government purchases gt is as specified in the main text.
A.7 Linearized FOCs
ϕĥt = −σĉt + ŵt, (68)




+ R̂nt − Et [π̂t+1] , (69)
ŵt = φ̂t + ẑt, (70)
D̂t + ŷt = ẑt + ĥt, (71)
π̂∗t = Ξ̂1,t − Ξ̂2,t, (72)
























(1− ψ) (π̄∗)1−ε π̂∗t = ψ (π̄)
ε−1 π̂t, (75)






ŷt = (c̄/ȳ) ĉt + (ḡ/ȳ) ĝt, (77)







R̂nt−1 − π̂t + b̂t−1
)
, (78)
τ̄ τ̂t = κb̄b̂t−1, (79)
R̂nt = ...., (80)
ĝt = ...., (81)
ẑt = ρz ẑt−1 + εz,t, (82)
ξ̂t = ρξ ξ̂t−1 + εξ,t, (83)
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A.8 Further derivations
Going forward, I assume that gross steady state inflation is equal to one: π̄ = 1.
Next, I substitute equations (73) and (74) into (72) to obtain:





Substitution of π̂∗t = (ψ/ (1− ψ)) π̂t (75) delivers the traditional New Keynesian
Phillips-curve:
π̂t = βEt [π̂t+1] + ζφ̂t, (85)
where ζ ≡ (1− ψβ) (1− ψ) /ψ.














A.8.1 The flexible prices equilibrium
Now I aim to derive the flexible prices equilibrium. To do so, I set ψ = 0 in
equation (84)
π̂∗t = φ̂t,
Since I know from equation (75) that π̂∗t = 0 when ψ = 0, I find that φ̂t = 0. Next,
I substitute expression (75) into equation (76), and find that D̂t = 0, irrespective
of whether ψ = 0 or not.
Now I consider equation (68), and substitute equation (70) for ŵt, expression
(71) for ĥt, and equation (86) to obtain:















σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ
)
ẑt + σ (ȳ/c̄)
(
(ḡ/ȳ)




A.8.2 The sticky prices equilibrium
Agiain I consider equation (174), and substitute equation (184) for ŵt, expression
(183) for ĥt, and equation (197). However, the difference with respect to the
flexible prices equilibrium is that φ̂t is no longer zero in equation equation (184).
I thus obtain:









+ ẑt + φ̂t,
Rearranging gives:
φ̂t = (σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ) ŷt − (1 + ϕ) ẑt − σ (ȳ/c̄) (ḡ/ȳ) ĝt
= (σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ) (ŷt − ŷnt ) = (σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ) ỹt, (88)
where ỹt ≡ ŷt − ŷnt denotes the output gap, the difference between the level of
output under the sticky prices equilibrium and the flexible prices equilibrium.
Substitution of expression (88) into equation (85) delivers the familiar New
Keynesian Phillips curve in the output gap ỹt:
π̂t = βEt [π̂t+1] + κỹt, (89)
where κ is given by:
κ = (σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ) ζ, (90)

























Now I substitute ŷt = ŷ
n
t + ỹt, and substitute expression (87) to get the aggregate
demand equation:
σ (ȳ/c̄) ỹt = σ (ȳ/c̄)Et [ỹt+1]−
(
R̂nt − Et [π̂t+1]− R̂∗t
)
, (92)









where R̂z∗t , R̂
ξ∗
t , and R̂
g∗
t are given by:
R̂z∗t = −σ (ȳ/c̄)
(
1 + ϕ
σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ
)
(1− ρz) ẑt, (94)
R̂ξ∗t = (1− ρξ) ξ̂t, (95)
R̂g∗t = σ (ȳ/c̄)
(
(ḡ/ȳ)ϕ
σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ
)
(ĝt − Et [ĝt+1]) , (96)
A.9 The fiscal divine coincidence
A divine coincidence is characterized as an equilibrium in which we have permanent
π̂t = 0 and ỹt = 0. The fiscal regime is characterized by R̂
n
t = 0. Such an
equilibrium, however, can only be achieved when the natural rate of interest R̂∗t = 0
irrespective of the realization of the productivity shock ẑt and preference shock ξ̂t.
To achieve that the divine coincidence equilibrium, government spending must
respond to productivity and preference shocks in such a way that its influence on
government spending exactly offsets the change in the natural rate arising from the
productivity and preference shocks. Therefore, I assume that government spending
is given by:
ĝt = Az ẑt + Aξ ξ̂t. (97)
I then immediately find that:
ĝt − Et [ĝt+1] = Az (1− ρz) ẑt + Aξ (1− ρξ) ξ̂t.
Substitution of the process for government spending into (93) allows me to find
the values of Az and Aξ such that the natural rate of interest R̂
∗












For the RANK-model, I will only investigate the stability conditions for the fiscal
regime. To do so, I substitute the government spending rule from the main text
(11) into the aggregate demand equation, which together with the New Keynesian
Phillips curve gives the following system of two-by-two equations (while keeping
R̂nt = 0):
π̂t = βEt [π̂t+1] + κỹt,
−Bgππ̂t + (σ (ȳ/c̄)−Bgy) ỹt = (1−Bgπ)Et [π̂t+1] + (σ (ȳ/c̄)−Bgy)Et [ỹt+1] + R̂z∗t + R̂
ξ∗
t ,
where B is given by:
B =
σ (ḡ/c̄)ϕ
σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ
, (98)





















































−κ (1−Bgπ)− β (σȳ/c̄−Bgy) −κ (σȳ/c̄−Bgy)

















Now I determine trace and determinant of M :
traceM =







As I have two forward-looking variables, I need two roots of the characteristic
equation of matrix M that are inside the unit circle (Bullard and Mitra, 2002).
First, I calculate the characteristic equation, and find that it is given by:
λ2 − traceMλ+ detM = 0.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) take the following characteristic equation:
λ2 + a1λ+ a0 = 0.
Hence in my case a1 and a0 are given by:
a1 = − traceM =
κ (1−Bgπ) + (1 + β) (σȳ/c̄−Bgy)
κBgπ − (σȳ/c̄−Bgy)
, (105)




A.10.1 The case where gπ ≤ 0 and gy ≤ 0
When gy ≤ 0, we see that σȳ/c̄ − Bgy > 0. With gπ ≤ 0, it immediately follows
that the denominator of (105) and (106) is negative, i.e. κBgπ−(σȳ/c̄−Bgy) < 0.
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Hence the first condition of Bullard and Mitra (2002) is satisfied. Now I look at
the second condition, i.e. |a1| < 1 + a0. To do that, I need to compute |a1|. Since
gπ ≤ 0, we immediately see that the numerator of (105) is always positive. Hence
the absolute value of a1 is given by:
|a1| =
−κ (1−Bgπ)− (1 + β) (σȳ/c̄−Bgy)
κBgπ − (σȳ/c̄−Bgy)
.
The condition that |a1| < 1 + a0 then boils down to:
−κ (1−Bgπ)− (1 + β) (σȳ/c̄−Bgy)
κBgπ − (σȳ/c̄−Bgy)
<
κBgπ − (1 + β) (σȳ/c̄−Bgy)
κBgπ − (σȳ/c̄−Bgy)
.
Multiplication of both sides of the inequality with the negative denominator κBgπ−
(σȳ/c̄−Bgy) < 0 transforms the inequality into the following way (where I have
to flip the inequality sign):
− κ (1−Bgπ)− (1 + β) (σȳ/c̄−Bgy) > κBgπ − (1 + β) (σȳ/c̄−Bgy) .
After canceling equal terms on the left and right hand side of the equation, I
find the condition −κ > 0, which does not hold, since κ > 0. Hence the second
condition of Bullard and Mitra (2002), i.e. |a1| < 1 + a0, and hence there are not
two roots inside the unit circle. Hence there is no unique stable equilibrium for
the case where gπ ≤ 0 and gy ≤ 0.
A.11 Analytical expressions for impulse response functions
In this section I calculate analytical expressions for the impulse response functions
to the productivity and preference shocks, and show that there exists an isomorphic
mapping between the coefficients of the monetary and fiscal policy reactions such
that the impulse response functions are identical.
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A.11.1 Monetary regime
I start by writing down the two-system equations for the monetary regime, where
I replace R̂x∗t = Rx∗x̂t, where x = {z, ξ}.
π̂t = βEt [π̂t+1] + κỹt,
σ (ȳ/c̄) ỹt = σ (ȳ/c̄)Et [ŷt+1]−
(
κππ̂t + κyỹt − Et [π̂t+1]−Rz∗ẑt −Rξ∗ξ̂t
)
,
Since there are no endogenous backward-looking state variables, I know that the
only state variables are ẑt and ξ̂t. Hence I can employ the method of undetermined
coefficients to find the analytical solution to productivity and preference shocks. I
assume that π̂t and ỹt are given by the following solutions:
π̂t = απ,z ẑt + απ,ξ ξ̂t, (107)
ỹt = αy,z ẑt + αy,ξ ξ̂t. (108)
Since both shocks are given by exogenous AR(1) shocks, I know that their expected
value is given by:
Et [π̂t+1] = ρzαπ,z ẑt + ρξαπ,ξ ξ̂t, (109)
Et [ỹt+1] = ρzαy,z ẑt + ρξαy,ξ ξ̂t. (110)
Substitution of the above expressions into the New Keynesian Phillips curve gives













Substitution of the guessed solutions for the output gap and inflation, and the
relation between the output gap coefficients and the inflation coefficients into the
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aggregate demand equation generate the following expressions for the coefficients:
αmπ,z =
κRz∗












κ (κπ − ρξ) + [κy + σ (ȳ/c̄) (1− ρξ)] (1− βρξ)
, (116)
where Rz∗ and Rξ∗ are given by:
Rz∗ = −σ (ȳ/c̄)
(
1 + ϕ
σ (ȳ/c̄) + ϕ
)
(1− ρz) , (117)
Rξ∗ = (1− ρξ) (118)
A.11.2 Fiscal regime
Next I solve for the impulse response fucnctions under the fiscal regime. The two
equation system is again given by:
π̂t = βEt [π̂t+1] + κỹt,
−Bgππ̂t + [σ (ȳ/c̄)−Bgy] ỹt = (1−Bgπ)Et [π̂t+1] + [σ (ȳ/c̄)−Bgy]Et [ŷt+1] +Rz∗ẑt +Rξ∗ξ̂t,
Again employing the method of undetermined coefficients generates the same re-
lationship between the inflation coefficients and the output gap coefficients, and
eventually results in the following expressions for the coefficients:
αfπ,z =
κRz∗












κ [−Bgπ (1− ρξ)− ρξ] + [σ (ȳ/c̄)−Bgy] (1− ρξ) (1− βρξ)
, (122)
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Comparing the solutions (113) - (116) under the monetary regime with those
under the fiscal regime (119) - (122), we see that there is an isomorphic mapping
under which the equilibrium paths for inflation and the output gap are identical
under both regimes. This is the case for the productivity shock when:








while we have the following mapping for the preference shock:









B Overlapping Generations Model
B.1 Households
A generation lives for two periods. The first period they are young, and in the
second period of their existence they are old, after which each generation dies. I
assume that each generation has a constant mass of 1 that does not change over
time. In the first period, the young earn income wtht(i) from providing labor,
and from ownership of the production firms ωt(i) (in terms of final goods). This
income is spent on consumption c1t (i), lump sum taxes τ
1
t (i), and savings in the
form of government bonds bt(i). Their budget constraint is then (in terms of final
goods) given by:
c1t (i) + τ
1
t (i) + bt(i) = wtht(i) + ωt(i), (127)
When turning from young to old, the old receive income from gross repayment of
the government bonds that were purchased when young as well as a pension income
st(i) provided by the government. This income is then used for consumption c
2
t (i)
and lump sum taxes τ 2t (i). The budget constraint for the old (in terms of final
goods) is then given by:







bt−1(i) + st(i), (128)
The old’s maximization problem is given by maximizing current consumption sub-









where ξ2t is a preference shock of the old. The Lagrangian for this problem is given
by:










bt−1(i) + st(i)− c2t (i)− τ 2t (i)
)
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The first order conditions are given by:














bt−1(i) + st(i)− c2t (i)− τ 2t (i)
)
= 0. (130)





















































bt(i) + st+1(i)− c2t+1(i)− τ 2t+1(i)
)]
.
After taking the derivatives with respect to c1t (i), ht(i), bt(i), and λ
1
t , I obtain the
following first order conditions:























wtht(i) + ωt(i)− c1t (i)− τ 1t (i)− bt(i)
)
= 0, (134)
where βΛ1,2t,t+1 ≡ βλ2t+1/λ1t denotes the young generation’s stochastic discount fac-
tor.
B.2 Production firms
In this subsection I only discuss the changes that I make to the production sector,
which turn out to be few. The structure with final goods producers, retail goods
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producers, and intermediate goods producers remains the same as before, as well
as all assumptions regarding their production technologies and the type of markets
they operate in. The only change that I have to incorporate is the fact that the old
generation is now the owner of all the production firms, rather than the infinitely-
lived household in the RANK model.
B.2.1 Final goods producers
As final goods producers face a static optimization problem, and do not make
any profits in equilibrium as they operate in a perfectly competitive market for
final goods, the optimization problem is exactly the same as in the case of a
representative infinitely-lived household.
B.2.2 Retail goods producers
The production technology of retail goods producers, as well as the fact that they
operate under monopolistic competition makes that their optimization problem is
the same as under the representative infinitely-lived household. The only difference
is that they are owned in period t by the generation that was born in period t,
while they will be owned in period t+1 by the generation born in period t+1, etc.
Therefore, the stochastic discount factor with which they discount future expected
profits will differ. I assume that they will value a cash flow in period t+s with the
marginal utility βλyt+s of the generation that will be young in period t+ s, where
future profits are discounted with the subjective discount factor β with which they
discount next period’s utility relative to today’s utility. Therefore, the retail goods
















subject to the demand curve (36), and where βsΛyt,t+s ≡ βλ1t+s/λ1t . Note that this
stochastic discount factor differs from the stochastic discount factor that the young
employ to discount the future cash flow from the government bond!
Apart from the change in the discount factor, the retail goods producers’ opti-
mization problem is identical to the optimization problem when a representative
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households are infinitely lived. Therefore, all the first order conditions are the
same, except for the replacement of the stochastic discount factor in first order
conditions (38) and (39), which are now given by:














However, it will be relevant to calculate period t profits ωft (in terms of the


















where I substituted the demand schedule (36) for retail goods f ∈ [0, 1].
B.2.3 Intermediate goods producers




The government budget constraint is now extended by a pension payment st to
the old. Otherwise the budget constraint is the same as in the RANK-model, and
is therefore given by:






Lump sum taxes are now not raised on a representative household, but on both









lump sum taxes on the young and old, respectively. In order to derive at a system
with only inflation and the output gap, I need an analytical expression for the
output gap, something I cannot achieve in a model which still features endogenous
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state variables. In order to eliminate these endgenous state variables, I assume
that lump sum taxes on the old τ 2t are exactly equal to the gross interest payments







Substitution of (139) results in the following government budget constraint:
τ 1t + bt = gt + st, (140)
For the young, I assume that the level of lump sum taxes τ 1t is linear in last
period’s stock of government debt bt−1:





As in the RANK-model, government purchases will be equal to its steady state
value under the monetary regime, while it will endogenously respond to inflation
and the output gap under the fiscal regime. Finally, I assume that the pension
payment st is linear in output. When the economy is in aboom, pensioners get
paid more than when the economy is in recession:
st = (s̄/ȳ) yt, (142)
B.3.2 Central bank
Monetary policy is exactly the same as in the RANK-model.
B.4 Aggregation
I assume that each member of the young is identical, and chooses the same level of
consumption and labor supply in equilibrium. Integrating over all young i ∈ [0, 1]











di = c1t (i).
Similarly, I find aggregate labor supply by the young to be equal to h1t = h
1
t (i), as





and aggregate profits from production firms ω1t = ω
1
t (i). Aggregation over young




t + bt = wtht + ωt, (143)
Substitution of the government budget constraint (140) then reads:
c1t + gt + st = wtht + ωt, (144)
Similarly, I can integrate over member i ∈ [0, 1] of the old generation to obtain the








bt−1 + st, (145)
Substitution of the old’s lump sum taxes (139) gives:
c2t = st. (146)
In other words, consumpton of the old is equal to the pension payment from the
government.
To find aggregate profits of the retail goods producers, I integrate the profits
















 df = yt −Dtφtyt, (147)
where I employed equations (37) and (42). Now I aggregate over the left hand side
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Combining the aggregated left and right hand side gives:
Dtyt = ztht. (148)
Substitution of this relation into the expression for the profits of retail goods
producers gives:
ωt = yt − φtztht = yt − wtht, (149)
where I used first order condition (44). Substitution of equation (149) into the
young’s aggregate budget constraint (144) gives:
c1t + gt + st = yt, (150)
Substitution of the aggregate budget constraint of the old generation (146) gives
the aggregate resource constraint of the economy:
c1t + c
2
t + gt = yt. (151)
B.5 Overview first order conditions (OLG)
A compeititve equilibrium is a series of quantities {c1t , c2t , ht, yt, gt, bt, τ 1t , τ 2t , st, ωt},
(shadow) prices



































bt−1 + st, (156)























1 = (1− ψ) (π∗t )
1−ε + ψπε−1t , (161)
Dt = (1− ψ) (π∗t )
−ε + ψπεtDt−1, (162)
Dtyt = ztht, (163)





t + gt, (165)
τ 1t + τ
2

















st = (s̄/ȳ) yt, (169)
Rnt = ...., (170)
gt = ......, (171)
log (zt) = ρz log (zt−1) + εz,t, (172)
log (ξt) = ρξ log (ξt−1) + εξ,t, (173)













ϕĥt = −σĉ1t + ŵt, (174)
















R̂nt−1 − π̂t + b̂t−1
)
+ s̄ŝt, (176)





π̂∗t = Ξ̂1,t − Ξ̂2,t, (178)
































(1− ψ) (π̄∗)1−ε π̂∗t = ψ (π̄)
ε−1 π̂t, (181)






D̂t + ŷt = ẑt + ĥt, (183)
ŵt = φ̂t + ẑt, (184)
ŷt = (c̄1/ȳ) ĉ
1
t + (c̄2/ȳ) ĉ
2



























R̂nt−1 − π̂t + b̂t−1
)
, (188)
ŝt = ŷt, (189)
R̂nt = ...., (190)
ĝt = ...., (191)
ẑt = ρz ẑt−1 + εz,t, (192)
ξ̂t = ρξ ξ̂t−1 + εξ,t, (193)
62
B.7 Further derivations
Going forward, I assume that gross steady state inflation is equal to one: π̄ = 1.
Next, I substitute equations (179) and (180) into (178) to obtain:





Substitution of π̂∗t = (ψ/ (1− ψ)) π̂t (181) delivers the traditional New Keynesian
Phillips-curve:
π̂t = βEt [π̂t+1] + ζφ̂t, (195)
where ζ ≡ (1− ψβ) (1− ψ) /ψ.
Next, I substitute expression (188) into expression (176) and find that:
ĉ2t = ŝt = ŷt, (196)
where I employed equation (189) and the knowledge that c̄2 = s̄. Substitution of
















B.7.1 The flexible prices equilibrium
Now I aim to derive the flexible prices equilibrium. To do so, I set ψ = 0 in
equation (194)
π̂∗t = φ̂t,
Since I know from equation (181) that π̂∗t = 0 when ψ = 0, I find that φ̂t = 0.
Next, I substitute expression (181) into equation (182), and find that D̂t = 0,
irrespective of whether ψ = 0 or not.
Now I consider equation (174), and substitute equation (184) for ŵt, expression
(183) for ĥt, and equation (197) to obtain:

































B.7.2 The sticky prices equilibrium
Agiain I consider equation (174), and substitute equation (184) for ŵt, expression
(183) for ĥt, and equation (197). However, the difference with respect to the
flexible prices equilibrium is that φ̂t is no longer zero in equation equation (184).
I thus obtain:












































where ỹt ≡ ŷt − ŷnt denotes the output gap, the difference between the level of
output under the sticky prices equilibrium and the flexible prices equilibrium.
Substitution of expression (199) into equation (195) delivers the familiar New
Keynesian Phillips curve in the output gap ỹt:
π̂t = βEt [π̂t+1] + κỹt, (200)





























+R̂nt −Et [π̂t+1] , (202)
Now I substitute ŷt = ŷ
n







ỹt = σEt [ỹt+1]−
(
R̂nt − Et [π̂t+1]− R̂∗t
)
, (203)








where R̂z∗t , R̂
ξ∗
t , and R̂
g∗
t are given by:
R̂z∗t = −
















R̂ξ∗t = (1− ρξ) ξ̂t, (206)








 (ϕĝt + σEt [ĝt+1]) , (207)
B.8 The fiscal divine coincidence in the OLG model
As before, a divine coincidence is characterized as an equilibrium in which I have
permanent π̂t = 0 and ỹt = 0. The fiscal regime is characterized by R̂
n
t = 0. Such
an equilibrium, however, can only be achieved when the natural rate of interest
R̂∗t = 0 irrespective of the realization of the productivity shock ẑt and preference
shock ξ̂t. To achieve that the divine coincidence equilibrium, government spending
must respond to productivity and preference shocks in such a way that its influence
on government spending exactly offsets the change in the natural rate arising from








I then immediately find that:
ϕĝt + σEt [ĝt+1] = A
OLG
z (ϕ+ σρz) ẑt + A
OLG
ξ (ϕ+ σρξ) ξ̂t.
Substitution of the process for government spending into (204) allows me to find
the values of AOLGz and A
OLG
ξ such that the natural rate of interest R̂
∗
























σ (ḡ/c̄1) (ϕ+ σρξ)
< 0,
B.9 Stability conditions under the OLG-model
In this subsction I will investigate the conditions under which unique stable equi-
libria are possible in the OLG New Keynesian model. I start by inspecting the
stability conditons under the monetary regime, after which I investigate the sta-
bility conditions for the fiscal regime.
B.9.1 The monetary regime
As in the main text, I employ a standard Taylor rule (10):
R̂nt = κππ̂t + κyỹt,
while I set government spending equal to steady state, i.e. ĝt = 0. After sub-
stitution of the Taylor rule into the aggregate demand equation, and combining
this with the New Keynesian Phillips curve (200), I get the following two by two
system of equations:






ỹt = σEt [ŷt+1]−
(






I write this in the following way:(
1 −κ

































where M and N are given by:
M =
1











































and where I note that:(
1 −κ















































Now I have to inspect the sign of the two roots of the matrix M to determine
under which conditions I have a unique stable equilibrium. As I have two forward-
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looking variables, I need two eigenvalues that are smaller in absolute value than
one. I start by calculating the characteristic equation of M .
λ2 − traceMλ+ detM = 0.
I now employ Bullard and Mitra (2002) to determine whether this is the case.
They start from the following characteristic equation: λ2 + a1λ + a0 = 0. In this
case I have:
a1 = − traceM = −
β
(













a0 = detM =
βσ







The first condition that needs to be satisfied according to Bullard and Mitra (2002)
is |a0| < 1:
|a0| =
βσ







where I assume in line with the literature that κπ ≥ 0 and κy ≥ 0. This condition
can be rewritten as:











The second condition is that |a1| < 1 + a0. Again assuming that κπ ≥ 0 and

















Back to the condition that |a1| < 1 + a0, which boils down to:
β
(


















+ κκπ + βσ








Multiplying by the denominator and rearranging, I can write this condition as:
κ (κπ − 1) + (1− β)
[








B.9.2 The fiscal regime
Next, I study stability under the fiscal regime. As in the main text, I employ the
government spending rule from the main text (11):
ĝt = gππ̂t + gyỹt.
while I set the nominal interest rate equal to steady state, i.e. R̂nt = 0. After
substitution of the government spending rule into the aggregate demand equation,
and combining this with the New Keynesian Phillips curve (200), I get the following
two by two system of equations:










ỹt = (1 +B
∗σgπ)Et [π̂t+1] + σ (1 +B
∗gy)Et [ŷt+1]
+ R̂z∗t + R̂
ξ∗
t ,






















































+ κ (1 +B∗σgπ) κσ (1 +B
∗gy)
βϕB∗gπ + 1 +B























where D is given by:





− ϕB∗ (gy + κgπ) , (219)


















































− ϕB∗ (gy + κgπ)
, (221)
As such, I now obtain the following Bullard and Mitra (2002) coefficients:

















− ϕB∗ (gy + κgπ)
,
(222)







− ϕB∗ (gy + κgπ)
, (223)
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Now assuming that gπ ≤ 0 and gy ≤ 0 implies that the denominator of a1 and a0
are positive. If I assume that in addition that the numerator of a1 is positive, I


















− ϕB∗ (gy + κgπ)
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− ϕB∗ (gy + κgπ)
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− ϕB∗ (gy + κgπ) + βσ (1 +B∗gy) .
This condition can be rewritten in the following way:
κ [−B∗ (σ + ϕ) gπ − 1] + (1− β)
[









Comparing inequality (224) with inequality (216), we see that there is a direct map-
ping from the monetary policy coefficients κπ and κy to the government spending
coefficients gπ and gy that makes the two inequalities isomorphic:
κπ = −B∗ (σ + ϕ) gπ =⇒ gπ = −
κπ
B∗ (σ + ϕ)
, (225)
κy = −B∗ (σ + ϕ) gy =⇒ gy = −
κy
B∗ (σ + ϕ)
, (226)
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B.10 Analytical expressions for impulse response functions
In the previous section I showed that there is an isomorphic mapping from the
stability conditions for the monetary regime to the stability conditions for the
fiscal regime. In this section I calculate analytical expressions for the impulse
response functions to the productivity and preference shocks, and show that there
also exists an isomorphic mapping between the coefficients of the monetary and
fiscal policy reactions such that the impulse response functions are identical.
B.10.1 Monetary regime
I start by writing down the two-system equations for the monetary regime, where
I replace R̂x∗t = Rx∗x̂t, where x = {z, ξ}.






ỹt = σEt [ŷt+1]−
(
κππ̂t + κyỹt − Et [π̂t+1]−Rz∗ẑt −Rξ∗ξ̂t
)
,
Since there are no endogenous backward-looking state variables, I know that the
only state variables are ẑt and ξ̂t. Hence I can employ the method of undetermined
coefficients to find the analytical solution to productivity and preference shocks. I
assume that π̂t and ỹt are given by the following solutions:
π̂t = απ,z ẑt + απ,ξ ξ̂t, (227)
ỹt = αy,z ẑt + αy,ξ ξ̂t. (228)
Since both shocks are given by exogenous AR(1) shocks, I know that their expected
value is given by:
Et [π̂t+1] = ρzαπ,z ẑt + ρξαπ,ξ ξ̂t, (229)
Et [ỹt+1] = ρzαy,z ẑt + ρξαy,ξ ξ̂t. (230)
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Substitution of the above expressions into the New Keynesian Phillips curve gives













Substitution of the guessed solutions for the output gap and inflation, and the
relation between the output gap coefficients and the inflation coefficients into the
aggregate demand equation generate the following expressions for the coefficients:
αmπ,z =
κRz∗
κ (κπ − ρz) +
[











κ (κπ − ρξ) +
[











κ (κπ − ρz) +
[











κ (κπ − ρξ) +
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where Rz∗ and Rξ∗ are given by:
Rz∗ = −
















Rξ∗ = (1− ρξ) (238)
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B.10.2 Fiscal regime
Next I solve for the impulse response fucnctions under the fiscal regime. The two
equation system is again given by:










ỹt = (1 +B
∗σgπ)Et [π̂t+1] + σ (1 +B
∗gy)Et [ŷt+1]
+ Rz∗ẑt +Rξ∗ξ̂t,
Again employing the method of undetermined coefficients generates the same re-
lationship between the inflation coefficients and the output gap coefficients, and
eventually results in the following expressions for the coefficients:
αfπ,z =
κRz∗
κ [−B∗gπ (ϕ+ σρz)− ρz] +
[












κ [−B∗gπ (ϕ+ σρξ)− ρξ] +
[












κ [−B∗gπ (ϕ+ σρz)− ρz] +
[












κ [−B∗gπ (ϕ+ σρξ)− ρξ] +
[










Comparing the solutions (233) - (236) under the monetary regime with those
under the fiscal regime (239) - (242), I see that there is an isomorphic mapping
under which the equilibrium paths for inflation and the output gap are identical
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under both regimes. This is the case for the productivity shock when:
κπ = −B∗ (σρz + ϕ) gπ =⇒ gπ = −
κπ
B∗ (σρz + ϕ)
, (243)
κy = −B∗ (σρz + ϕ) gy =⇒ gy = −
κy
B∗ (σρz + ϕ)
, (244)
while I have the following mapping for the preference shock:
κπ = −B∗ (σρξ + ϕ) gπ =⇒ gπ = −
κπ
B∗ (σρξ + ϕ)
, (245)
κy = −B∗ (σρξ + ϕ) gy =⇒ gy = −
κy
B∗ (σρξ + ϕ)
, (246)
C Calibration
The numerical values for the relevant parameters can be found in Table 1. The
parameter κ that is part of the linearized Phillips-curve can be found from the ex-





β Subjective discount factor 1
σ CRRA coefficient 1
ϕ Inverse Frisch elasticity 1
Production Sector
ε Elasticity of substit. (goods) 10
ψ Calvo prob. (price stickiness) 0.75
Policy Parameters
π̄ Inflation rate target 1
ḡ/ȳ Steady state govt expenditures 0.2
Shock processes
ρz Productivity shock 0.95
ρξ Preference shock 0.9
σz Std. dev. productivity shock 0.01
σξ Std. dev. preference shock 0.01
Table 1: List of calibrated parameter values and source of calibration.
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